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Managing the unintended consequences of 
competitive tendering.  
Monopolies, public monopolies, competitive tendering: 
how and when should each be used under EU law? 
Dr. John Temple Lang1 
 
Abstract 
This paper outlines the legal position in terms of EU regulations of the various options for 
delivering public services.  It considers the situation where for a number of reasons the 
service is delivered by a public or private monopoly.  The circumstances in which the 
procuring authority uses competitive tendering, regulation or some combination of both are 
outlined.  The regulations around State aid and the Altmark and Teckal exemptions are 
explained. Crucially, for the Scottish ferry industry, the question of what happens when the 
domestic incumbent loses a contract is raised. The broad scope for taking into account social 
and environmental considerations in awarding a contract for the delivery of a public service 
are elucidated. The difficulty of ensuring such contracts are specified in a way that is both 
lawful and effective are explained.  The paper concludes that regulation rather than tendering 
RISXEOLFFRQWUDFWVPD\EHDVLPSOHUDQGPRUHHIIHFWLYHPHWKRG WRHQVXUH WKDW WKH µPRVW
economiFDOO\DGYDQWDJHRXV¶RXWFRPHLVDFKLHYHG 
I Introduction and background 
Competitive tendering is required for important contracts for the supply of goods and services 
to public authorities. It is used for the grant of concessions giving the right to provide goods 
or services to the public. The purpose of requiring competitive tendering is, in popular terms, 
to get the best value for money, from private companies competing to provide services to the 
public in general. 
Rights given by way of concession are frequently rights to monopolies. Monopolies can be 
privately or publicly owned. The justification given for a monopoly may be non-economic and 
social, as in the case of monopolies granted for gambling or for the sale of alcohol. When a 
monopoly concession is granted, the conventional explanation may be that a monopoly is 
needed to ensure that all available economies of scale and scope can be obtained, and 
passed on to users.  Another  conventional reason is that the services to be provided include 
some that are unavoidably unprofitable,  and  that these services, since they  have to be paid  
for somehow, can most  conveniently  be paid  for by cross-subsidising them from the  
revenue  from  profitable  activities2  If this  option   is  chosen, the company involved needs 
                                                          
1 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Brussels, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, University of Oxford and 
Visiting Professor, Trinity College, Dublin. 
2 Case C-320/91, Corbeau, EU: C: 1993: 2533 
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to be protected from "cherry picking" by competitors who wish to provide only  profitable 
services.  
A second alternative, which would be a public subsidy to cover the cost of the unprofitable 
activities, would involve expense to taxpayers and cost accounting to estimate the cost of the 
activities to be subsidised.  The monopoly might be justified by the  need  to give the  investors  
an assurance of a profit in the long term if very  large  initial  investment  were  needed  in  
e.g.  a large waste   management   plant, an airport or a toll-road.     A third   alternative   is 
a publicly-owned enterprise which, if it has a monopoly, automatically cross-subsidises its 
operations to whatever extent may be necessary. 
Public authorities often consider it necessary to ensure that certain services are made 
available to everyone (universal service) at a uniform cost. The most familiar example is the 
postal service. Other   examples   are   utilities,   water,   gas,   energy,   health,   transport,   
waste   management,   and communications (television, telephone and broadband). The 
combination of a universal service obligation and a uniform price frequently means that some 
of the services will necessarily be uneconomic to supply. 
If it is decided to set up or maintain a monopoly, it may be thought necessary to decide for 
how long it should be granted, how it should be regulated, what obligations should be 
imposed, and how wide the exclusive rights granted should be. (For example, a monopoly of 
the right to provide shipping services to areas with few inhabitants would not extend to the 
right to provide air transport for passengers or goods). If the obligations imposed result in 
some services being uneconomic, it may be necessary to decide whether taxpayers should 
pay some of the cost, rather than relying only on cross-subsidisation. It will also be necessary 
to plan procedures for putting the monopoly up for competitive tender again and designed in 
such a way that as far as possible the incumbent enterprise will not have unbeatable 
advantages. If the company that obtains the monopoly is required or expected to invest in 
infrastructure, it will be essential to decide how that investment is to be financed. 
Cross-subsidies can be of many different kinds. A shipping line with obligations to service 
less inhabited areas may subsidise its uneconomic winter services from its profitable summer 
operations, or its unprofitable passenger operations from profitable commercial operations. 
Or it could subsidise its services to less inhabited areas from the profits of busy routes.  If it 
is decided not to have a monopoly, it is necessary to decide how uneconomic activities, 
resulting from universal service obligations, are to be paid for. 
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II The principles of EU law on State enterprises and monopolies   
The principles of EU law on State enterprises and monopolies can be summarised as follows 
(cf. Temple Lang, 2008, Buendia Sierra, 1996, Blum and Logue, 1998, Jones and Sufrin, 
2008, Edward and Lane 2013) 
x Directive 2014/24 deals with public procurement in general, but this does not apply 
to transport, which is dealt with by Directive 2014/25. 
x Member States must  not adopt any measures  that make  EU competition  law  
ineffective,  or  that make  it likely that a company  in a dominant position  will abuse 
its dominance. 
x European law does not prohibit publicly owned enterprises, and it allows monopolies 
to be set up and maintained if there are good reasons. Monopolies can be granted 
or maintained both for privately-owned and publicly-owned companies. 
In theory, Member States can justify setting up or extending a monopoly only if that is 
necessary to achieve a legitimate (i.e. non-protectionist) purpose3, and (perhaps) if no less 
restrictive alternative would be appropriate. In practice, however, the justification for setting 
up or maintaining a monopoly is rarely looked at critically. No justification is required for 
setting up or maintaining a publicly-owned company. 
All the competition rules apply even to State owned enterprises, subject to the exception for 
"Services of General Economic Interest", which is narrowly interpreted.  Member States may 
exempt those Services from EU law rules, but only insofar as those rules would obstruct the 
performance of the specific tasks imposed on them. A company obliged to provide a service 
of general economic interest does not need to be publicly owned. 
The most important justification for setting up a monopoly is that, without the exclusive rights 
conferred on it, it would not be possible for the enterprise to carry out its tasks "under 
economically acceptable conditions", that is, without the exclusive rights it would be 
impossible for it to have an expectation of being able to make an acceptable profit, on 
condition that it is reasonably efficient.  It may not be necessary to show that no less 
restrictive alternative was available. However, a monopoly that would otherwise be justified  
is  illegal  if  it  cannot  carry  out  efficiently the tasks assigned to it (eg a public employment  
agency  without  the  resources  needed  to find jobs satisfactorily)4 or if it is necessarily 
involved in situations of conflict  of interest  (e.g. if it  is given power to regulate its own 
                                                          
3 Case C-553, Dimosia, EU: C: 2014 
4 Case C-41/90, Hafner and Elser v. Macrotron, EU: C: 1991: 1979 
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competitors, or given the duty to supply key services to them)5.  If the monopoly is wider than 
is needed to enable the company to make a reasonable profit, the monopoly is illegal to the 
extent of the unnecessary restriction on competition. Even if a basic monopoly is justified, it 
may be unjustifiable to extend it6 
A statutory monopoly is not required by EU law to be set up by competitive tender 
If the Member State decides to finance the public service provider out of public funds, under 
the Altmark judgment7 payments that merely compensate for the cost of carrying out the 
service are not State aid. But the public service obligation must be clearly defined: the 
compensation must be calculated objectively and transparently and it must not exceed the 
cost of providing the service, plus a reasonable profit. If the enterprise is not chosen in a 
public procurement procedure, the compensation must be determined based on an analysis 
of the cost of a typical undertaking, well run, would have incurred in discharging the 
obligations, taking into account a reasonable profit. Unless all four conditions are fulfilled, 
there is State aid. The effect of this is that the rules on State aid are stricter than the rules on 
public monopolies, at least as the latter are applied in practice. 
A public authority can award a contract without a competitive tender process if the authority 
controls the economic entity, and the entity carries out the essential part of its activities with 
the authority8. 
There are also sector-specific provisions of EU law on various public services, in terms of 
universality, continuity, quality, affordability and protection of consumers and users.  It is 
assumed that as far as possible public services should be provided by competitive markets. 
A monopoly that is an "enterprise" (unlike eg a compulsory health insurance scheme based 
on "solidarity") is subject to all the usual obligations  of  a  dominant  enterprise  under  Article  
102  TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union),  in addition to whatever  
obligations  are imposed  by  the measure  establishing the monopoly. 
Although these principles are fairly clearly established, they are not always strictly enforced. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Case C-163/96, Raso EU: C: 1998: 533 
6 Case C-475/99,  Ambulanz  Glockner, EU:  C: 200 I : 8089 
7 Case C-280/00 Altmark, EU: C: 2003: 7747 
8 This is known as the "Teekal Exemption". See Case C-15/13, Technische Universitat Hamburg v. 
Daten/otsen, EU: C: 2014. See Article 12 of Directive 2014/24 
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III Obligations under Article 102, Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) 
Statutory monopolies over infrastructure may have various obligations under Article 102, the 
most important of which are probably as outlined below. In any situation in which these issues 
seem likely to arise, they should probably be dealt with in advance in the conditions for the 
grant or maintenance of the monopoly, if they are not dealt with by sector-specific regulation. 
 
x The monopolist should not "tie" the monopoly services to other services not 
covered by the monopoly. For example, it should not carry cars on a car ferry 
only if the passengers are staying in hotels owned by the company. 
x If it has a monopoly of conventional car and passenger ferries, it should not use 
its control over eg a harbour to refuse access to means of transport not covered 
by its monopoly eg hovercraft or high speed passenger ferries. 
x It should not make agreements or arrangements the effect of which would be to 
make it significantly more difficult for a competitor to tender for the monopoly right 
when the right comes up for renewal. 
x It should not discriminate between companies using its services. 
x It should not create or increase obstacles or difficulties for competitors, but has 
no duty to help them unless it is a monopoly and has committed an abuse, and a 
duty to give access or to help otherwise is the appropriate remedy for the abuse 
(Temple Lang, 2016). 
Several questions arise from the issues outlined.  
In the case of a monopoly said to be needed for financial or economic reasons, what precisely 
is needed in modem conditions, and why? Why would a State subsidy be less satisfactory? 
When was the monopoly set up? Was the grant of monopoly ever the subject of competitive 
tendering? Should it be subject to competitive tendering now? Has the Member State a duty 
under Article 4(3) TEU to introduce some competition, at least into the selection of the 
monopolist? 
If it is thought that a new monopoly is justified, for how long should it be granted, on what 
terms, how should it be regulated, and what obligations should be imposed? Is any State 
subsidy required, and if so, why? In particular, how should the prices or profits of the company 
be regulated? 
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What obligations, if any, may be imposed for reasons not based on the need to make a 
modest profit, but for example in the interests of the environment or the local communities in 
the areas served? For example, may the company be required to give preferential 
employment opportunities to individuals living in the local communities? 
More fundamentally, if an enterprise has been developed over a long period to provide 
services to a community, is it possible and meaningful to put the service up to competitive 
tender at intervals, risking by implication the possibility that it will be awarded to another 
enterprise, and that the long-established enterprise will need to be wound up? This question 
is not resolved by saying, however truthfully, that an incumbent will always have legitimate 
advantages, and is likely to win a competitive tender. If an outsider has no real chance of 
succeeding against the incumbent, what would be the point of a competitive tender 
procedure? Would it be better to regulate the incumbent as far as is thought necessary, 
notwithstanding the risk of "regulatory capture" (the regulated enterprise acquiring undue 
influence over the regulatory authority)? 
EU law allows Member States to establish Services of General Economic interest, and to 
ensure that they are not subject to EU competition rules insofar as those rules would obstruct 
the tasks imposed on them. This is, in effect, a form of regulation, which allows Member 
States to  impose a  wide variety of tasks and conditions, and to subsidise tasks  insofar as 
they are loss making9. 
IV Unintended consequences of competitive tendering for specific 
projects 
It is said that competitive tendering can lead to loss of domestic employment and loss of 
strategic capacity. Both criticisms need to be addressed. In theory, to be comprehensive, a 
wide variety of different situations would need to be considered.  
Competitive tendering cannot lead to loss of domestic employment if all the companies 
bidding are based (or are legitimately required to base themselves) in the region in question. 
Indeed, it is not competitive tendering, but successful companies from outside the region that 
may lead to loss of domestic employment. Companies can be selected if they offer "the most 
economically advantageous" solutions "from the point of view of the contracting authority", 
that is, the best value, even if they do not offer the lowest price10. This phrase should be 
interpreted to allow selection of the solution most advantageous for the locality or region, not 
merely the solution most advantageous financially for the license granter. Article 67 says that 
                                                          
9 Case C-280/00 Altmark, EU: C: 2003: 7747 
10 Article 67 of Directive 2014/ 24: Article 82, Directive 2014/25 
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the "best price-quality ratio ....shall be assessed  on the basis of criteria, including qualitative, 
environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject matter of the public contract in 
question".  
Award criteria or contract conditions concerning the workforce to be used are legitimate. It 
would, for example, be normal practice to oblige companies tendering for public contracts to 
have non-discriminatory hiring policies. The criticism therefore is that sometimes the most 
economically advantageous solution may involve employment of labour from outside the 
region, when local residents could equally well have been employed. That may be so, but 
there would be no justification for saying that the effect on employment in the region may not 
be taken into account when choosing the most economically advantageous solution, 
including long term effects. This is so in particular where the overall object of the exercise is 
to benefit communities in less populated areas. 
One requirement that might be explicitly adopted to obtain the most economically 
advantageous solution might legitimately be that it would employ residents of a less-
populated and under-industrialised region as far as is reasonably possible. This might be 
criticised as protectionist, and undoubtedly requires careful drafting, since it could easily 
result in illegal discrimination in favour of the incumbent or in favour of local companies. 
However, it might well be reasonable and justified, depending on the circumstances. Other 
possible selection criteria   or contract conditions would be to require the successful bidder 
to provide training for residents of the region, or to employ individuals who speak the local 
language, if it is a working language, or to use local sub-contractors as far as possible. The 
result of such an approach would probably be a negotiated arrangement:  negotiated 
arrangements are envisaged by the Directive. 
The most economically satisfactory solution should be assessed on a long term basis, and 
not only in the short term.  Specifically, it may be appropriate to oblige the successful tenderer 
to invest substantial sums in improving the service or the infrastructure, and the result of this 
might be to contribute to employment in the region as well as improving the facilities for   
everybody. 
"Loss of strategic capacity" would occur as a result of competitive tendering  only  if  the  
contract awarded to a company outside the region was for such a long period that it became 
no longer possible for companies  in the region  to bid  for the  contract when  it came up for 
renewal.  If that were  the result, the alternative would be that a solution that was not the 
most economically advantageous solution would be adopted on a permanent basis, for the  
sake  of  preserving  indigenous  strategic  capacity that, ex hypothesi, was not initially able 
to offer that solution. There may in theory be such situations, but it is not easy to think of a 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
8 
 
convincing example.  If such a  situation  seemed  likely  to arise, the appropriate approach 
might be to invite tenders for partners in a joint venture with local or regional interests  
providing  some  of the strategic  capacity  that  it is desired  to maintain  and  develop.  A 
local or regional cooperative should be able to mobilise whatever resources are available for 
such a purpose. 
In other words, in both types of situation it would seem possible to use imagination to design 
an invitation to tender in such a way as to avoid or minimise the unintended consequences 
that are feared. It would be unjustified to conclude that the undesired consequences would 
inevitably be so serious and so unavoidable that no competitive tender should be arranged, 
and that therefore an inefficient incumbent monopoly or a high cost solution should be 
allowed to continue indefinitely. Discussions with companies that have expressed an interest, 
having been invited to do so, might be necessary to design the invitation to tender 
appropriately. 
One suspects that some of the difficulties that have occurred in particular cases arose 
because the possible implications for local employment were not considered and provided 
for when the invitation to tender was being drafted, and were seen too late to be dealt with 
satisfactorily. 
No amount of careful drafting can prevent situations arising in  which  the  lowest  price  is  
offered by a company from outside the region, and the operations of the  company  in  
question  may reduce employment in the region. Emphasis on the most economically 
advantageous solution overall, however, should allow the decision making body to choose 
the higher cost solution if that is thought appropriate. 
But in any situation in which it is feared that competitive tender might lead to disruption of a 
community, or of a long established and reasonably efficient service, regulation as the 
alternative to competitive tendering should be considered. The relative merits of the two 
approaches would be a matter for judgment, and European law would not dictate the result. 
V Competitive advantages and potential competition 
If there is an incumbent providing substantially the service to be put up for competitive tender, 
in practice a reasonably efficient incumbent will almost always have significant and perfectly 
justifiable advantages over any competing outsider. On the other hand, if the service is 
entirely new and there is no incumbent, the arguments for competitive tender will be 
extremely strong. But even then it is legitimate to choose the most economically 
advantageous solution, provided that the invitation to tender is appropriately written, and not 
necessarily to choose the cheapest solution. If there is no incumbent, competitive tendering 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
9 
 
cannot result in loss of domestic employment: at most, it could involve a missed opportunity 
to increase it, if suitable employees were available. 
It is not unusual for a small local or regional company to be in competition with a larger 
company based outside the region. In such situations economies of scale and scope may be 
very important, and it is important, when writing the terms for the tender, to decide how much 
weight should be given to them. In general however scale economies are more likely to 
influence the lowest price rather than the most economically satisfactory solution. 
All companies that are not exposed to competition have a tendency to become inefficient and 
to stagnate and fail to modernise. Even if the circumstances are such that the legitimate 
advantages of the incumbent make it likely that it will be selected in a competitive tendering 
process, the mere fact of having to reconsider and if necessary to redesign its service every 
few years should help to ensure that it gives appropriate weight to the interests and needs of 
consumers and users. An incumbent that knows that it must take part in a regular tendering 
process will be likely to pay more attention to the services being offered elsewhere by 
potential rivals, and should improve its own operations accordingly. Potential competition is 
often a more effective influence for improvement than regulatory supervision, and in any case 
they are not mutually exclusive. 
It should also be remembered that if an incumbent is supervised or regulated in some way, 
there is always a risk of "regulatory capture", that is, the entity supposedly being supervised  
may obtain too much influence over the thinking of the body intended to supervise or regulate 
it. That risk should be significantly reduced if both parties know that a competitive tendering 
process will occur at regular intervals, provided that the final conditions of each tender are 
determined by an authority other than the supposed supervisor. 
Value for money in public procurement is said to be based on economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness.  Economy and efficiency are self-explanatory and can be measured. 
Effectiveness is more difficult to measure, for a range of reasons. First, we are making a 
judgement based on defined objectives, and there arises a question about whether such 
objectives are the   "right" ones:  has   the organization   targeted   the most   beneficial   
outputs and   outcomes?  Secondly, the ultimate outcomes for most public services are better 
lifestyles for individuals and healthier, better educated, better housed, more economically 
successful and more stable and cohesive communities as a whole. Judgements around 
these things are notoriously subjective, and often politically and culturally sensitive. 
(Arrowsmith, 2014) 
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This view is certainly correct, and several conclusions can be drawn from it. First, the 
authority that is defining the objectives of the project has a considerable latitude and 
discretion in defining them in the invitation to tender. However, it should be careful to define 
them clearly and explicitly. Second, if the authority's decision is challenged in court, the court 
should be slow to invalidate either the objectives stated in the invitation to tender or the 
decision finally arrived at by the awarding body. In other words, the court should not substitute 
its discretion for the discretion of the awarding body. Third, all the desired objectives may not 
be fully obtainable at the same time, and priorities may need to be decided, or compromises 
reached. 
VI 7KH µPRVWHFRQRPLFDOO\DGYDQWDJHRXV¶VROXWLRQ IRU WKHFRPPXQLW\ LQ 
question 
A fourth conclusion seems reasonable. It is open to  national  legislatures, acting within  the 
terms of the EU directives, to explain and elaborate by  legislation  the  concept  of  the  "most 
economically advantageous" solution, to make it more clear that it includes social and 
environmental objectives and advantages for the community in question as well as  financial  
advantages  for  the  taxpayer paying the bill. National legislation to clarify and confirm this 
may  not be necessary,  but  it might be desirable, in order to promote flexibility  and  reduce  
uncertainty  about  the  freedom  of awarding authorities to promote their chosen objectives, 
and to avoid or minimise unintended consequences. 
"Effectiveness" can mean both the success of the project in the light of its declared objectives, 
and the desirable effects of the way in which it is to be carried out. The invitation to tender 
can, if the awarding authority wishes, indicate how the work is to be  done (although  the 
authority should  not  tie  the hands  of the  successful  competitor  so much  that  little scope 
is left for initiative  and imagination). 
These suggestions do not mean that the awarding authority can create a situation in which it 
is discriminating in favour of the incumbent or local firms: all arrangements of the kinds 
suggested would need to be carefully written and justified. They would therefore be more 
trouble to write, and probably more controversial to implement, than a simpler arrangement, 
or than regulation. The authority would therefore need to consider carefully whether the extra 
work was worthwhile. 
VII Sector specific regulation 
If the industry in question is a regulated  industry,  such as transport  or telecommunications, 
the  regulatory  regime  may  provide   protection  for  local  or regional  interests that  it might  
be difficult to ensure by selection criteria or conditions in public contracts alone. In any case, 
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any invitation to tender must always be carefully integrated into the applicable regulatory 
regime. A regulatory approach may be more appropriate and more effective to achieve 
economic aims than trying to use public contracts alone. If the objectives are important, all 
available legal mechanisms should be considered, and used in combination if appropriate. 
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